tion is not in issue." The contemporary scheme of labor regulation may not constitute the best of all possible worlds, but it is at least a possible one. More importantly, there is little evidence that the movement toward national control of the labor-management relation will be either reversed or diverted. Thus one of the basic premises upon which this discussion proceeds is that Congress has established a national labor policy which carries obvious implications of exclusive federal authority. Nevertheless, the most meaningful objection to a comprehensive application of federal power is that state power is obliterated without regard to whether state intervention actually obstructs federal policy in a concrete case.
1 If in fact the content and application of right-to-work legislation entails a substantially high risk of derangement of basic federal objectives, the argument for a balancing of federal-state interests on a case-by-case basis loses much of its appeal. The effect of right-to-work acts must therefore be tested against the backdrop of national purposes and objectives inferable from federal legislation. The enlargement of the power of one regulatory system inevitably creates jurisdictional tensions with competing systems. In the enactment of the NLRA in 1935 Congress took firm hold of the processes of employee organization and collective bargaining s and of the NLRA in 1947 and 1959, revisions which swept federal power into virtually every aspect of collective bargaining. 10 The rough guarantees of employee organizational rights contained in the original NLRA were accordingly transfonned into a vast and comprehensive code of rights and duties" 1 directed in part toward concerted employee activities, an area traditionally subject to local control.' 2 The result was a recurring series of disputes as to which system, federal or state, should regulate the highly volatile subject of union economic power. Defining the limits of state power generated by right-to-work statutes is merely one phase of the continuous process of gauging the extent to which federal presence displaces local authority. In the area of "union security,"' 3 however, additional difficulties exist because Congress chose not to be consistent in its over-all objective of a uniform labor policy. The failure of the NLRA to either sanction or prohibit the closed shop or the union shop was understandably The principal significance of the LMRDA is that it represents the first congressional effort at regulating internal union government. In addition, the LMRDA made a number of important amendments to the NLRA, primarily in connection with union unfair labor practice provisions. "'In its present amended form, § 8 of the NLRA enumerates specific unfair labor practices by unions as well as employers, and spells out the affirmative duties of collective bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964) . Section 7 presently provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities ... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) .
12 Not until the Taft-Hartley Act did federal law attempt to regulate the exercise of union economic pressures on employees and employers. Strikes, boycotts, and picketing, if regulated at all prior to 1947, were subjects of state concern exclusively. See generally Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 46 Micff. L. REv. 593 (1948) .
18 The term "union-security" describes a variety of arrangements, usually contractual, whereby union membership is made a condition of employment. The traditional types of clauses include: (1) the closed shop, which permits the hiring only of members of the appropriate union; (2) the full union shop, under which all employees must join the union within a certain period, typically within 80 days of hiring; (3) the modified union shop, which allows new members to withdraw from membership at stated periods, or exempts old employees who are not members; (4) maintenance of membership, which imposes no membership requirement, but does require employees who join the union to continue their membership; and (5) the agency shop, which requires non-union employees to pay to the union a sum equal to fees and dues paid by members. Hiring arrangements designed to protect or favor union members in securing jobs are often referred to as forms of union-security, as is the "checkoff," a device whereby the employer makes a deduction from the paychecks of employees and transmits amounts so deducted to the union. See generally LAB. REL. RE'. (LRX) 643 (1967) .
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DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967 [Vol. : 1079 accepted as federal recognition that compulsory unionism was a matter of state law. 14 It was therefore not unexpected that a number of states, beginning with Florida in 1944, should proceed to regulate union-security through the enactment of right-to-work laws, 15 or that such laws would successfully resist challenge on federal as well as state grounds.' 6 The federal attitude toward union-security, however, was drastically altered in the Taft-Hartley Act. Rather than restricting all forms of union-security arrangements, Congress in section 8 (a) (3) expressly permitted agreements conditioning employment upon union membership in specified situations.1 7 The effect was to outlaw the closed shop, but approve the union shop which complies with federal standards."" Simultaneously, the power of a union to use the membership obligation as a basis for affecting employment was narrowly circumscribed.'
9 Yet having entered the union-security area, 
U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1964).
15 Laws banning any and all forms of union-security contracts had been enacted in twelve states by the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments. A summary of the status of state legislation on union-security at that time appears at 21 L.R.R.M. 66-68 (1948) .
16 The constitutionality of state right-to-work laws was sustained against due process objections in Plumbers Local 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) ; AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949) ; and Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) . Such laws have usually been found not to offend state constitutions. E.g., Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949) . " T Section 8 (a) (3) declares that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .. 2. " 9 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1964) . The first proviso to that section, however, permits unionsecurity in the following circumstances: "Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 9 (e) within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement .... " Id.
's The ban of the closed shop results from the requirement of pre-existing union membership, whereas the membership obligation in a union shop clause is incurred subsequent to the securing of employment. See note 13 supra.
as The second proviso to § 8 (a) (3) reads as follows: "Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such member- Congress did not commit the field exclusively to federal regulation. In section 14 (b) it gave express recognition to local interests and sought to preserve to the states an area within which right-to-work laws might operate:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law. 20 In enacting section 14 (b), Congress was free to preempt as much or as little of the subject matter of union-security as it desired. 21 That it authorized the states to ban any form of compulsory unionism which federal law might accept has never been seriously questioned. 22 Beyond this threshold premise, the dividing line between federal and state power becomes dim and obscure. If federal and state restrictions apply concurrently in businesses affecting commerce, 23 the Taft-Hartship was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1964) . If a labor organization or its agent attempts to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of § 8 (a) (3), this constitutes an unfair labor practice. under § 8 (b) (2). 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2) (1964) . The practical effect of these provisions is to limit the burdens of membership upon which employment may be conditioned to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. In other words, as long as an employee subject to a union shop agreement tenders required dues and fees, he may ignore all other union-imposed obligations and still not be discharged for non-membership even though he is not a formal member. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (1951) . Section 8(b) (5) further protects employees subject to a union-shop agreement by prohibiting excessive or discriminatory membership fees. 29 US.C. § 158 (b) (5) (1964) . 2o29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1964).
'In 1951
Congress amended the Railway Labor Act to permit union shop agreements in the railroad and airline industries "notwithstanding any . . . provisions" of state law. Railway Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964) . As a result, right-to-work laws have no validity in industries subject to that Act. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, The rationale of Garmon is readily apparent: the broad powers conferred upon the Labor Board to interpret and enforce the complex federal law of labor relations necessarily imply that potentially conflicting rules, remedies, or administrative practices cannot be permitted to operate because of the danger of impairment of national labor policy. 26 Rzv. 542 (1959) . A summary of preemption cases preceding Garmon appears in the Court's opinion in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 474-77 (1955) .
26 Perhaps the best statement of the reasoning which ultimately produced Garmon is to be found in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953) : "Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision ....
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules ... . A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law."
27 It should not be overlooked that preemption does contemplate some degree of diffusion of power. In Garmon the Supreme Court recognized that preemption would be inoperative where labor activity is merely of "peripheral concern" of the NLRA or touches interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." 359 U.S. at 243-44. An overriding state interest has traditionally been found to exist in cases involving intimidation, violence, or a threat to public order. E.g., UAW v. 24 (1963) .
Congress has, in addition, carved out some specific exceptions to exclusive NLRB 1086 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967 [Vol. : 1079 courts may assert jurisdiction over labor activity which reasonably appears within the coverage of the NLRA, either as protected or prohibited conduct. 28 In order to insure that matters subject to federal law actually reach the specialized hands of the Labor Board without state interference, initial and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether conduct falls within preempted categories is entrusted to the Board itself.
29
Since Congress has undertaken explicit regulation of unionsecurity in section 8 (a) (3), labor activities involving the conditioning of employment upon union membership may be "arguably subject" to the protections or prohibitions of the NLRA. Yet section 14 (b) gives express recognition to state power to deal with such matters.
jurisdiction. For example, section 301 (a) of the NLRA provides that suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought in a federal court without regard to diversity of citizenship or the amount in controversy. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (194) . Preemption doctrine has been held not to preclude a suit in a state court under § 301 where the contract breach is concededly within the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the NLRB. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) . The application of preemption to suits on collective agreements is analyzed in Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HAv. L. Rxv. 529 (1965) . In addition to § 301, violations of the secondary-boycott provisions of § 8(b) (4) are expressly made subject to damage actions in the courts by § 303 of the NLRA even though such practices are subject to Board jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964) .
28 The broad language of § 7 of the NLRA protects from employer reprisals a wide range of concerted employee activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964); see, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Similarly, it has long been established that a state may not impose restrictions upon labor activities protected by federal law. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) . The guarantees of § 7 are in turn federally implemented by specific prohibitions of employer and union conduct in § 8. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964) . In addition to conduct arguably protected or prohibited by federal law, Garmon made clear that certain activity may in fact be "neither protected nor prohibited" and still not subject to state regulation. 359 U.S. at 245. But see UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) . The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that state regulation of activities neither federally protected nor prohibited is ousted where circumstances warrant the application of preemption doctrine. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1964) . Given the mechanics of the "arguably subject" test, few preemption cases can be expected to arise in which there is a ciear determination by the NLRB that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited. But see Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965) .
29 The crux of preemption doctrine is that the NLRB is entitled to the first opportunity to regulate a labor dispute which appears within the coverage of federal law. The judicial function is therefore limited: "We need not and should not now consider whether the . . . activity in this case was federally protected or prohibited, on any of the theories suggested above or on some different basis. It is sufficient . . . to find, as we do, that it is reasonably 'arguable' that the matter comes within the Board's jurisdiction." Plumbers' Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696 (1963) . If a case presents a situation where "essentially undisputed facts" are subject to "compelling precedent," Garmon indicated that a court may act in the absence of a prior Labor Board determination. 359 U.S. at 246; cf. Ex parte George, 371 U. S. 72 (1962) .
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Nevertheless, assuming that preemption does not oust the states of power under section 14 (b) to prescribe and enforce their own policies of union-security, these local policies must still be reconciled with federal policies which explain the necessity for a doctrine of preemption in the first place.
In 1963 the Supreme Court for the first time elected to engage in a discussion of the unique problems posed by the application of preemption to state jurisdiction arising from section 14 (b). The case of Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,3 0 in which the Court wrote two opinions (Schermerhorn I and Schermerhorn 11), presented the question of whether Florida courts had jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of a union-security agreement prohibited by the Florida right-to-work act. 8 1 As a result of section 14 (b), the Supreme Court acknowledged that "there will arise a wide variety of situations presenting problems of accommodation of state and federal jurisdiction in the union-security field." 3 2 In making the accommodation in the immediate case, it was decisive to the Court that Congress, by the inclusion of section 14 (b), had left the states free to legislate with respect to union-security even to the extent of outlawing arrangements which satisfied federal standards. 38 Since state policy was accorded such a high priority, the Court concluded that state tribunals possessed jurisdiction to implement that policy, 3 4 at least to the extent of enjoining an executed union-security clause.
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The first opinion appears at 373 U.S. 746 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as
Schermerhorn 1], and the second is reported at 375 U.S. 96 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Schermerhorn 11].
3 1 The Florida Supreme Court had found that an agency shop clause in a collective agreement was forbidden by the right-to-work provision of the state consitution, and that the Florida courts could enforce the prohibition in an injuction procceding. Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Local 1625 , 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962 . In Schermerhorn I the Supreme Court agreed that the union-security agreement in question was within § 14 (b) and therefore subject to prohibition by Florida law. 373 U.S. at 752. The issue left for consideration in Schermerhorn I was "whether the Florida courts, rather than solely the National Labor Relations Board, are tribunals with jurisdiction to enforce the State's prohibition" of a union-security agreement. The union had taken the position that the execution or application of a unionsecurity agreement in violation of a right-to-work law is arguably an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, and therefore only the NLRB may afford relief. 375 U.S. at 103. The argument assumes that the only effect of § 14 (b) is to remove the protection of the § 8 (a) (3) proviso in right-to-work states, with the result that the conditioning of 1088 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967 [Vol. : 1079 Having already found in Schermerhorn I that section 14 (b) subjected the agreement in question to state substantive law, 3 5 the conclusion that Congress must have intended that the states have jurisdiction to enforce the prohibitions of local law was practically irresistible. To have concluded otherwise would give credence to the somewhat startling proposition that preemption demands greater uniformity in the area of union-security, section 14 (b) notwithstanding, than in the general field of labor relations. It would have also meant that the Labor Board is required to effectuate the diverse policies reflected in the complex pattern of right-to-work legislation. Thus, by way of analogy, the Court reinforced the principle of nonuniformity in section 14 (b) by reaffirming its previous holding in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Company v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 386 to the effect that a state may reinstate with back pay an employee discharged pursuant to a collective agreement which violates a local union-security law.
The effect of the Schermerhorn litigation is to confirm that section 14 (b) shelters state right-to-work laws from the full impact of preemption. The facts of that case, however, afforded the Supreme Court little more than an opportunity to sketch the boundaries of the immunity in broad outline. The controlling factor was the existence of a written union-security agreement which by its terms was subject to state prohibition. Absent such an agreement, conduct arguably proscribed by the NLRA, even though involving unionsecurity, would be a matter exclusively for the Labor Board under standard preemption doctrine.
3 7 This result obtains because the regulatory scheme designed by Congress contemplates that "state power, recognized by § 14 (b), begins only with actual negotiation and execution of the type of agreement described by § 14 (b) Underlying the theory of preemption in the labor field is the basic assumption that courts are ill-equipped to engage in an ad hoc inquiry into the precise nature and degree of federal-state conflict in each labor dispute. Thus, as Garmon made clear, the function of preemption is to delimit "areas of potential conflict" by dealing with "classes of situations" rather than to attempt to balance relative interests in the circumstances of a given case. 40 As a matter of mechanics, the "arguably subject" test simply reflects the judgment that it is desirable to leave to the National Labor Relations Board initial determination of the status of doubtful conduct under federal law. Aside from the stated ground rules of preemption, however, the sheer proximity of a state court to a labor dispute has always entailed the risk that local courts will assert the power to categorize activity on the merits in order to decide whether they have jurisdiction. 41 If Schermerhorn II in effect says that a local court is empowered to enforce the law and afford a remedy for the violation. It follows that where section 14 (b) is concerned, the power of a state court to initially assess activity relating to union-security arrangements is not confined to the "arguably subject" standard of Garmon. Even v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964 Fla. 1962) . The preemption argument was made in the trial court, but the action was dismissed on the ground that the agreement on its face was not in conflict with the right-to-work law. Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Local 1625, 47 L.R.R.M. 2300 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1960). The preemption argument was renewed in the Florida Supreme Court, but expressly rejected. 141 So. 2d at 274-75.
"Although the Supreme Court held that the legality of the clause in question "is governed by the decision of the Florida Supreme Court under review here," 373 U.S. at 757, the Court did concede that "in all probability the preemption issue was entitled to different treatment than it received in the Flordia courts ......
Id. at 755. The Court did not press the issue since, in the interim, both the Court and the Board had taken positions on the status of an agency shop under § 14(b) consistent with the disposition made by the Florida Supreme Court. 373 U.S. at 755-57.
though the arrangement is clearly or potentially subject to federal law, the states may apparently decide for themselves whether section 14 (b) subordinates federal law to local policy.
The enlargement of state power to assess union-security arrangements facilitates the application of state law in situations not contemplated by section 14 (b). Where commerce is affected, state jurisdiction is solely dependent upon this section of the NLRA. It should not be surprising, then, that the state decisions reveal a tendency to lift section 14 (b) from its federal context, isolate it from preemption doctrine, and pursue primarily the question whether the conduct at hand is governed by the letter or spirit of local law. 44 Preoccupation with the fact that Congress left the states free to legislate with respect to union-security tends to obscure the total framework of federal law. 45 As a result, the attention of a state court is likely to be diverted from the threshold issue of whether conduct falls within a preempted category, section 14 (b) notwithstanding. That this risk is more than theoretical is evidenced by state decisions which fail even to reach the preemption issue, 46 or do so only after establishing a basis for state jurisdiction. 47 Aside from the sound- the preemption argument was raised in the trial court, but the action was dismissed on another ground. The state supreme court reversed upon finding the complaint stated a violation of a right-to-work act, but refused to consider the issue of exclusive federal jurisdiction because it had not been passed on below. The treatment of the issue of jurisdiction on a motion for a temporary restraining order under a right-to-work law is illustrated in Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. On the one hand, the Schermerhorn formula prescribes a limited range of competence within which a state court may decide to intervene in a labor dispute on the basis of a right-to-work law. 49 On the other hand, the content of right-to-work legislation pulls in the opposite direction without regard to the limited phrasing of section 14 (b), or the narrow construction placed on that section by the Supreme Court. In terms, section 14 (b) authorizes the states to prohibit "the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment." 5° Yet a reading of the various right-to-work laws compels the conclusion that the states have used the authority-conferred by this section to make labor policy that reaches far beyond the mere prohibition of membership agreements. 5 ' In fact, the subject of agreement would "The timing of state intervention is significant because injunctive relief is frequently sought in right-to-work cases. As one commentator has observed, "even the temporary quelling of concerted activity may have a conclusive practical effect on the denouement of a labor dispute, an effect which cannot be corrected by a subsequent discovery that the sanction was erroneously imposed." Michelman, supra note 7, at' 649.
,9 State jurisdiction, recognized by § 14 (b), "begins only with actual negotiation and execution" of the type of agreement described therein. 51 See notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text. The degree to which a right-towork law regulates labor relations as such is indicated by provisions which appear to make individual bargaining superior to collective bargaining. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-201 (1960) provides: 'Treedom of organized labor to bargain collectively, and freedom of unorganized labor to bargain individually is declared to be the public policy of the State .... " The Texas act declares that the "inherent right of a person to work and bargain freely with his employer, individually or collectively, for terms and conditions of his employment shall not be denied or infringed by law, or by any organization of whatever nature." Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5207a (1) (1962). The federal principle of exclusiveness of a bargaining agent is also put in doubt in states with laws stating that "tlhe right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account" of union membership, and then declaring that "all contracts in negation or abrogation of such rights" are illegal. ND. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1960) . One court, construing the word "abridged" to mean "diminished, reduced, curtailed or shortened," has held an exclusive recognition clause in a collective agreement to violate a right-to-work Vol. 1967 Vol. : 1079 appear to operate as merely a point of departure for the supervision of a wide range of labor practices. 52 A recurring pattern in the statutes is to phrase prohibitions in such broad and vague terms that almost any practice inconsistent with right-to-work policy is covered. 5 3 A common provision, for example, outlaws any "combination" whereby a union acquires an "employment monopoly." 5 4 A further technique is to insert clauses which expressly regulate the organizational activities of unions 55 and the use of the strike and boycott weapons 5 " without regard to the framing of section 14 (b) in terms of "agreements." The extent to which right-to-work laws attempt to insulate employment from union influence is demonlaw. Piegts v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 228 La. 131, 81 So. 2d 835 (1955) . Such vague provisions as those contained in the above mentioned North Dakota act potentially conflict with federal legislation at various points, such as the § 8 (e) restrictions and exemptions relating to "hot-cargo" agreements added by the LMRDA amendments. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (e) (1964) . With respect to hot cargo agreements, at least one right-to-work law contains express restrictions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46.6 (1) (1962). 52 The checkoff, for example, is usually regarded as a form of union-security even though, standing alone, it does not typically condition employment upon membership. Yet right-to-work statutes frequently regulate checkoff arrangements in ways more restrictive than federal law. as In order to conclusively outlaw union-security arrangements, the South Dakota act states that: "Any agreement relating to employment ... which by its stated terms, or by implicatioh, interpretation, or effect thereof, diredy or indirectly denies, abridges, interferes with, or in any manner curtails the free exercise of the right to work . .. " is a violation. S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (2) (Supp. 1960). Any "understanding or practice which is designed to cause or require, or has the effect of causing or requiring" a violation of the right-to-work act is illegal. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16-5 (1966). The phrase "illegal conspiracy against public policy" frequently appears in such laws. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 6984.5 (b) 6 or example, the Nevada act, without mentioning an agreement conditioning employment upon membership, in one section provides: "It shall be unlawful ... to compel or attempt to compel any person ... to strike against his will or to leave his employment by any threatened or actual interference with his person, immediate family or property." N-v. REV. STAT. § 613. 270 (Supp. 1965) . Arizona has a nearly identical provision. Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1304 (1956) . The South Carolina statute contains broad restrictions on union economic weapons. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46.6 (1962) . 1094 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967 [Vol. : 1079 strated by a clause which declares illegal the requirement that an employee "have any connection with" a union as a condition of employment 5 7 The protracted reach of right-to-work legislation creates a series of obstacles to enlightened administration of labor law on the local level. To begin with, the concept of right-to-work is in many respects inconsistent with the principles of free choice, majority rule, and exclusive representation upon which the federal philosophy of labor relations is constructed. 5s The organization of employees, even on the basis of the political principle of majority support, obviously restricts the freedom of the individual worker. 59 Nevertheless, national policy reconciles group and individual interests on the theory that self-organization promotes private adjustment of the labormanagement relation through orderly collective bargaining. 0 A right-to-work act runs counter to this objective in that it seeks, in absolute terms, to clear away every restriction which collectivism imposes upon individual choice. 61 Hence when state legislatures 57 "No person is required to have any connection with, or be recommended or approved by, or be cleared through, any labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-245.5 (Supp. 1965). The Supreme Court of Wyoming, reasoning that a bargaining agent must necessarily have some "connection" with non-union employees in the unit, has struck down this section as conflicting with the exclusive representation provisions of § 9 (a) of the NLRA. Electrical Workers Local 415 v. Hanson, 400 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1965).
1 "National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with7 his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
11 It should be noted that the exclusive bargaining agent's statutory authority to represent all workers in the unit does carry with it a statutory obligation to fairly represent the interests of non-members as well as members. (1944) .
"1 Since a right-to-work act restricts the freedom of a majority union and an employer to negotiate a union-security agreement as a part of the collective bargaining
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exercise the authority granted by section 14 (b) to regulate labor activities ranging beyond membership agreements, the chances of conflict between already conflicting policies are markedly intensified.
The effects of unwarranted statutory breadth are readily apparent in right-to-work decisional law. Since state judges are accustomed to disposing of disputes in accordance with local law, the mere existence of a state statutory provision covering the case at hand, coupled with a concession of its violation, may be sufficient to tip the scales against the preemption argument. 8 2 Federal labor statutes afford little guidance either as to the nature of state power or the standards to be used in determining whether it is applicable. If a judge turns to state law, the sweeping pronouncements of public policy contained in a right-to-work act have substantial appeal. 6 3 The failure of such legislation to be explicit about jurisdictional limitations would also appear to reduce the persuasiveness of preemption defenses. 64 Jurisdictional issues are not easily separated from the merits of a labor dispute. Substantive standards of conduct, especially when legislatively declared in strong language, create a hostile environment for the argument that a state may not apply those standards where they are clearly violated. 6 5 process, the practical effect is to curtail the exercise of rights which § 7 purports to further in the national interest. It has been argued that this basic inconsistency in philosophy cannot be defended on the basis of an overriding state interest. (1963) .
a4 Right-to-work laws generally fail to even faintly suggest that they might be inapplicable where commerce makes federal law controlling. The following provision in the Arizona act illustrates the all-inclusive approach of such laws: "Any act or any provision in any agreement which is in violation of this Act shall be illegal and void." ARIZ. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1303 (A) (1956) . The prohibitions of the Wyoming act are declared applicable "notwithstanding any other law to the contrary." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-245.7 (Supp. 1965). 85 The simple fact that a right-to-work law frequently appears as a constitutional provision, or in a statute pitched in terms of constitutional guarantees of due process, would appear to encourage state enforcement in the face of doubtful jurisdiction. jurisdiction by purporting to distinguish.preemption precedents on grounds which are in fact insignificant or illusory. 6 s Further evidence of a disposition to prefer right-to-work policy can be seen in decisions which seek to enlarge federally recognized exceptions to preemption.'" Resistance to preemption may also in part explain the relatively large number of right-to-work injunctions issued by trial courts. 70 A number of appellate court judges have openly confessed that they do not subscribe to the view that a state is wholly without "6An interesting subject of speculation in the right-to-work area is whedier employers have experienced relatively greater success than unions in raising the preemption defense. 
App. 1963).
With respect to the general labor field, one commentator has observed: "[A]dding up the effects of ignorance and misunderstanding of the preemption doctrine, and what in some cases seems to be a deliberate determination to grant injunctions in spite of it, there is still, in practice, a large body of labor activity which is subjected to state power." Hays, supra note 41, at 382. authority to vindicate interests embodied in local law3
1 Indeed, the simplified test of state power set forth by the Supreme Court in Schermerhorn II, and the limited sphere of state jurisdiction which it produces, may be a direct attempt to counter the lack of sympathy with preemption evidenced by state courts. The Court on at least one occasion in recent years has strained its appellate jurisdiction in order to deal with a right-to-work decision rendered in defiance of preemption doctrine. 72 If in fact the states are disposed to employ right-to-work statutes as a vehicle for softening the impact of federal control, it becomes increasingly important that Congress and the Supreme Court establish firm guidelines for the exercise of state power. The purpose of Congress is reputed to be the "ultimate touchstone" in arriving at a decision to preempt or not 8 Nevertheless, in light of the fact that the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted at a time when the seeds of preemption had only begun to take root, it cannot seriously be urged that Congress foresaw the variety of jurisdictional problems that have arisen under section 14 (b) as a result of the vigorous application of federal law 7 4 The phrasing of this section, read in connection with its legislative history, does, however, afford some valuable guidance.
Because the first proviso to section 8 (a) (3) of the NLRA expressly validates agreements conditioning employment upon union membership, 75 it was necessary that Congress add section 14 (b) in order to achieve even the limited objective of permitting the states to touch the subject of compulsory unionism in plants in commerce. 7 S. 542 (1963) , the Court reviewed a state order directing the issuance of a temporary injunction on the theory that, under the particular circumstances, the temporary order was equivalent to a final order. See notes 143-46 infra and accompanying text.
73 375 U.S. at 103. The inference that Congress intended exclusive NLRB jurisdiction to lie is usually drawn on the basis of the nature of the particular interests being asserted and "the effect upon the the administration of national labor policies of concurrent judicial and administrative remedies." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967) .
74The Court in Garmon observed that many preemption problems "could not have been, at all events were not, foreseen by the Congress. Others were only dimly perceived and their precise scope only vaguely defined." 359 U.S. at 240.
75 Section 7 also contains an exemption for membership agreements "as authorized in section 8 (a) (3)." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) . far as federal law was concerned, Congress was willing to accept a compromise philosophy of union-security which outlawed the most serious abuse of compulsory unionism, the closed shop, yet preserved union-security to the extent of permitting arrangements which condition employment upon financial support of the bargaining agent." The statutory pattern followed by Congress suggests that its primary concern in section 14 (b) was to make clear that the states were not obligated to accept even the limited form of compulsory unionism preserved in federal law. Rather, the states were given the option to decide for themselves whether the federal solution was palatable as a matter of policy. This analysis is supported by the manner in which Congress addressed section 14 (b) to the permissive language of the section 8 (a) (3) proviso. 7 8 Congress simply invited the states, if they so desired, to enact provisions more restrictive of union-security than federal law. It should be clear, therefore, that the federal standards embodied in section 8 (a) (3) are highly relevant to a determination of the nature of state power contemplated by section 14 (b). An "agency shop" clause-one that requires as a condition of continued employment that non-members pay to a union sums equal to fees and dues paid by union members-has proved a useful device for exploring the connection between the two sections. Until 1963 it was unclear whether the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues in lieu of actually joining the union constituted "membership" within the section 8 (a) (3) proviso. 79 The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Genthat Congress was aware that its regulation of union-security agreements might be understood to put such matters beyond state control: "Since by the Labor Act Congress preempts the field that the act covers insofar as commerce ... is concerned, and since when this report is written the courts have not finally ruled upon the effect . . . of State laws dealing with compulsory unionism, the committee has provided expressly •.. that laws ... of any State that restrict the right of employers to require employees to become or remain members of labor organizations are valid, notwithstanding any provision of the National Labor Relations Act." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947 593, 598-99 (1948) .
19 The NLRB has never subscribed to the view that Congress intended the § 8 (a) (3) proviso to validate only the union shop. Rather, the Board has read the proviso as protecting lesser forms of union-security. American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952); Public Serv. Co., 89 N.L.R. B. 418 (1950) .
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eral Motors Corporation," 0 answered the question in the affirmative, reasoning that the conditioning of employment upon the payment of dues and fees is the "practical equivalent" of "membership" within the meaning of the proviso to section 8 (a) (3).81 At the same term, the Court went the next step in Schermerhorn I, and held that an agency shop agreement is within the scope of section 14 (b) and therefore subject to prohibition by a state right-to-work law. 8 2 The rationale of the decision was simply that "the agreements requiring 'membership' in a labor union which are expressly permitted by the proviso are the same 'membership' agreements expressly placed within the reach of state law by § 14 (b)." '8 3 On the surface, the broad principles set out in General Motors and Schermerhorn I would appear to operate as a major limitation on state power to regulate union-security; i.e., section 14 (b) subjects to state law only those agreements, or their equivalent, which are permitted by section 8 (a) (3). One obvious consequence of this test is that state courts, in determining whether a right-to-work law is 'applicable, are to be guided by federal standards. The state decisions to date, however, strongly suggest that primary importance has been given to internal standards when preemption is raised in the context of a right-to-work law. 4 So long as right-to-work acts retain their present form, attempts to apply such legislation in accordance with federal criteria are likely to result in frequent instances of improper state action and, consequently, a waste of judicial resources.
The practical implications of a failure to evaluate section 14 (b) in its federal setting can be demonstrated in connection with hiring s08 73 U.S. 734 (1963). a, Id. at 748. This result was predictable in light of the Court's earlier indication that forms of union-security other than the closed shop were congressionally included in the predecessor to the § 8 (a) (8) 
STATE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
hall arrangements. As a matter of federal law, a non-discriminatory hiring hall agreement-one that calls for referrals irrespective of union membership-is valid in the absence of evidence of actual discrimination in the operation of the hall. 8 5 Conversely, many rightto-work acts expressly or impliedly outlaw hiring halls without regard to whether they are in fact discriminatory 3 6 For example, Arkansas prohibits the denial of employment for failure or refusal to "affiliate with" a union.8 7 The courts of that state have held that a hiring hall agreement which makes a union the sole and exclusive source of referrals violates the statute on the ground that a non-union member who registers at the union hall is thereby required to "affiliate" with the union. 8 South Carolina would reach the same result on the theory that any attempt to affect employment through clearance or referral by a union necessarily contravenes right-to-work policy. 9 The reasoning of these decisions is significant when assessed in conjunction with the proposition that section 14 (b) can prohibit only what the section 8 (a) (8) proviso allows. As a matter of federal law, the validity of a hiring hall agreement, non-discriminatory on its face, does not depend on compliance with the requirements of that proviso. 90 Thus it should be appreciated that state regulation of hiring halls in commerce amounts to a bold enlargement of section 14 (b).
The first occasion for a federal court to consider the problem arose from the refusal of a multi-employer group to bargain about a hiring hall proposal. The employers took the position that such a clause was illegal under the Texas right-to-work law. 91 00 Since a non-discriminatory hiring hall does not, by definition, require union membership as a condition of referral, and thus employment, it is not a form of unionsecurity within the § 8 (a) (3) proviso. court found the proposed clause unlawful and enjoined a strike called by the union in support of its contract demands, 9 2 even though the case was clearly within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. The union thereupon filed with the Board a section 8 (a) (5) refusal-to-bargain charge, which was sustained on two theories: (1) federal law makes a non-discriminatory hiring hall a mandatory subject of bargaining, and (2) such an arrangement is not a form of union-security under the section 8 (a) (3) proviso, and hence is not subjected to state regulation by section 14 (b).
93
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board on both theories. 94 As to the second ground of decision, the court relied on the General Motors and Schermerhorn cases for the principle that section 14 (b) contemplates "only those forms of union security which are the practical equivalent of compulsory unionism." 95 Although the result reached is not exceptional, 90 a portion of the court's opinion typifies the confusion which surrounds this entire area. The analysis of the Fifth Circuit builds from the premise that the clause in question does not constitute compulsory unionism because actual union membership is not prescribed. Although the agreement by its very nature may encourage membership, the court reasoned that it still was not equivalent to compulsory unionism "so long as the arrangement is not employed in a discriminatory manner." 97 The inference is clear that if the agreement is administered in such a way as to discriminate against non-members, it would be practically equivalent to compulsory unionism. If so, it arguably follows that the green light is given state power under section 14 (b).
or nonmembership" in a union and prohibits contracts which require "applicants for employment" to become or remain union members. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
5207a (2), (3) (1962).
"2The court issued a temporary restraining order pending final hearing. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Should this line of reasoning ever gain wide acceptance, state jurisdiction under section 14 (b) would be extended into areas subject to the exclusive remedial powers of the NLRB. 9 s If the states attempt to duplicate NLRB jurisdiction, the basic purposes underlying the decision to avoid conflict by the creation of an expert administrative agency would be frustrated. That the potential for conflict is real is evidenced by the number and variety of occasions in which the states have drawn on a right-to-work law to regulate alleged discriminatory practices.P 9 If the working rule is to be that the content of section 14 (b) is determined by reference to arrangements which are federally acceptable under the section 8 (a) (3) proviso, then perhaps the descriptive test of the "practical equivalent" of compulsory unionism is unfortunate in that it lends itself to expansive application. 00 Given the failure of right-to-work statutes to reflect the prevailing philosophy of federal-state labor relations, coupled with the slowness of state courts to adjust to preemption teachings, predictability in the handling of section 14 (b) requires that rules of general application be fairly precise.
PRE-AGREEMENT ActiVITIES
A policy of concurrent right-to-work jurisdiction is subject to greatest stress in connection with concerted economic pressure, usually in the form of peaceful picketing, which is allegedly calculated to compel an employer to adopt employment policies contrary to local law. Schermerhorn II reaffirms the view that picketing to induce an employer to hire all-union labor is exclusively a federal 08 See notes 168-73 infra and accompanying text. The possibility that state intrusions into the area of NLRB jurisdiction can or will be corrected on appeal offers little assurance that the resulting harm to federal policy will in fact be undone. The record of state appellate courts in right-to-work cases subject to preemption reveals many inconsistencies. Case-by-case review by the Supreme Court is simply not feasible, and involves a fragmentary "rear guard" kind of process. See Gregory, Federal or State Control of Concerted Union Activities, 46 VA. L. RFv. 539, 560-62 (1960) .
91 See Grodin & Beeson, supra note 83, at 107-08. Since right-to-work is essentially a problem of discrimination, and § 8 (a) (3) and § 8 (b) (2) are primarily concerned with discriminatory practices, conflict between federal and state law is inescapable.
100 Difficulties in administering the Schermerhorn I test of state power may be encountered by reason of the broad language used by the Court to sustain a narrow exception to preemption doctrine. For example, the Court envisioned § 14 (b) as manifesting congressional intent to "abandon any search for uniformity" and to "suffer a medley of attitudes and philosophies" on the subject of union-security. 375 U.S. at 104-05. At another point the Court stated "we can only assume that it [Congress] intended to leave unaffected the power to enforce those laws." 375 U.S. at 102; accord, Kitchens v. Doe, 194 So. 2d 258, 260 (Fla. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
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matter even though the activity clearly violates a right-to-work law.' 01 Hence state courts are preempted of jurisdiction to enjoin such conduct under section 14 (b), or award damages for consequential harm, i ' 0 2 but must defer to the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. The denial of state power to regulate antecedent pressures has been criticized as being inconsistent with the policy and legislative history of section 14 (b).10 Since that section in terms preserves state laws proscribing union-security agreements, it is argued that the grant of power is meaningless unless the states are free to deal with economic pressure designed to produce unlawful agreements.
04 Such criticism has merit only if the record of state regulation of concerted activity relating to union-security warrants a conclusion that dominant federal objectives can be realized when the states are free to apply their own laws to antecedent pressures. The unevenness of state regulation of concerted employee activity stems primarily from a failure to grasp the idea that the involvement 10 o Any thought that Schermerhorn II is merely dictum on the issue of state power to regulate picketing under § 14 (b) has subsequently been put to rest by the Court in Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome Co., 377 U.S. 126 (1964) . In that case picketing was employed to force a contractor to execute an agreement whereby only workers referred by defendant unions would be hired. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affnrmed an injunction against the picketing on the ground it was designed to attain an objective forbidden by the right-to-work act. 1057, 1064-69 (1958) . A major consideration bearing on state power to award damages under right-to-work acts should be the heroic proportions of such verdicts. For example, in one case compensatory damages of $15,000 and punitive damages of $35,000 were awarded an employee who claimed he was denied employment by reason of compulsory unionism. Sheet Metal Workers Union v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 188, 360 P.2d 204, 205 (1961 years decided a series of cases which upheld the power of a state to enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of some state public policy announced by either the judiciary or the legislature. 07 Although set in the context of constitutional limitations upon state power to enjoin peaceful picketing, these decisions generally incorporated the broad "unlawful purpose" theory; i.e., a state may enjoin labor conduct designed to accomplish a purpose declared unlawful by state law. 08 A right-to-work law was assimilated into this line of cases in Local 10, Plumbers v. Graham, 0 9 wherein the Court sustained an injunction against peaceful picketing on the ground that the fourteenth amendment does not preclude a state from enjoining conduct carried on "with at least one of its substantial purposes in conflict" with a right-to-work law." 0 In reality, what this group of decisions really said was that the states may constitutionally regulate peaceful picketing in areas open to state regulation. Nevertheless, a considerable number of courts read these opinions as allowing the states wide discretion in the formulation and implementation of domestic labor policy. When the expression of public policy took the form of a right-to-work statute, the scope of which was seldom questioned because of the enabling effect of section 14 (b), the result was a flood of state decisions sustain- ing injunctions on a finding that the purpose of picketing was unlawful. 111 The critical point is that the line of Supreme Court authority followed by many of these injunction decisions did not involve the doctrine of preemption at all. Since interstate commerce was not involved in such cases as Graham, the issue of the preemptive effect of federal regulation of picketing was never raised, 112 although the process of foreclosing state regulation of the subject matter of labor relations was well underway by the early fifties.
13
With the Garner v. Teamsters Local 7761 4 decision in 1953, the Supreme Court supplied a rationale for the ouster of state jurisdiction with respect to the peaceful picketing of an employer in commerce. Although the basis of the state injunction was not a right-towork law, the Court made clear that primary and exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate recognitional picketing was vested in the NLRB in order to insure uniform application of federal policy and to avoid the "conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies." 1 5 Undoubtedly the failure of Congress and the Court, at an early date, to define preemption in the context of injunctions against concerted activities based on right-to-work laws contributed to the analytical unsoundness of many state decisions. Yet the far-reaching pronouncements of Garner concerning the necessity for uniformity in the regulation of labor relations should have had some impact upon the right-to-work states." 6 A theoretical basis for the applica- to withdraw such "matters of local concern" from state control.
118
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and without argument or opinion, reversed the injunction by simply citing the preemption cases of Garner and Weber v. Incorporated. 19 Since neither of the authorities cited by the Court in Farnsworth & Chambers Company involved a right-to-work law, the precedential value of the case may have been impaired. The inconsistent response of state courts to the decision lends support to such an evaluation. 20 Yet the case can only be explained on the ground that section 14 (b) does not permit the states to regulate pre-agreement activities otherwise subject to the preemption doctrine. Whatever doubts that may have lingered after In a case involving picketing designed to coerce an interstate contractor into executing a union agreement, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that Garmon precluded equitable relief, but not an award of damages for economic loss resulting from picketing. Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co. v. DeVries, 77 S.D. 273, extended the theoretical underpinnings of Garmon to a damage remedy imposed by a state court under the authority of section 14 (b). In effect, DeVries declared that picketing which is not enjoinable by the states because of the operation of the preemption doctrine, cannot provide a basis for damages in tort.
One obvious lesson of this brief sketch of the development of preemption in relation to section 14 (b) is that the Schermerhorn delineation of state power does not erect novel doctrine. A further lesson is that Supreme Court decisions spelling out that preemption preempts, even where section 14 (b) is concerned, have not controlled state decisional law with respect to concerted employee activities. Even since 1957, the year Farnsworth '& Chambers Company was decided, there have been numerous state decisions awarding preventive relief against picketing on the authority of right-to-work legislation.
122
Considerations of policy and administration would appear to tip the scales in favor of the restrictive view of state power formulated in Schermerhorn. Antecedent pressures directed at securing a union-security arrangement encounter federal law at a number of crucial points. Stranger and minority picketing by a union to compel an employer to agree to a union-security contract is arguably a violation of section 8 (b) (2).123 Alternatively, the conduct may come within the comprehensive restrictions imposed on organizational and recognitional picketing by section 8 (b) (7).124 If the picketing 91 N.W.2d 663 (1958) . The Supreme Court, without argument or opinion, reversed citing only Garmon. V2 Even though an appellate court may deny injunctive relief, as was the case in Baumgartner's Elec. Constr. Co. v. DeVries, 77 S.D. 273, 91 N.W.2d 663 (1958 ), ret'd, 359 U.S. 498 (1959 121 Section 8 (b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of § 8 (a) (3). 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2) (1964). This section clearly reaches minority picketing to secure a union-security agreement. Meat Cutters Union v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U. S. 20 (1957) . The degree to which peaceful picketing involves the NLRA was indicated by the Supreme Court in Construction Local 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1963) . See notes 143-46 infra and accompanying text.
'"
It is an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (7) for a union: "to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization . . . or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or [Vol. 1967: 1079 1108 DUKE LA WJO URNAL encompasses neutrals, it draws into question the unfair labor practice provisions of section 8 (b) (4).125 Assuming a union has majority status, the use of economic weapons to support demands for a unionsecurity contract prohibited by state law may constitute a refusal to bargain in violation of section 8 (b) (3).2 6 On the other hand, an inquiry into the facts might indicate that a federal unfair labor practice was not committed under any of these sections, but rather the conduct was protected concerted activity within the meaning of section 7 of the NLRA.'m Were courts permitted to make this kind of determination, a real possibility exists that the states would restrict the exercise of picketing rights guaranteed by federal law. 128 Particularly is this so where the basis of injunctive relief is a right-to-work law. As a source of substantive law, such legislation draws heavily on common law and equity principles which federal labor legislation long ago rejected as incompatible with the continuing labor-management relation. 354, 356-57 (1959) .
226 Section 8 (b) (3) imposes on a union the obligation to bargain collectively with an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964) . Insistence upon a union-security contract prohibited by state law would apparently violate § 8 (b) (3). See 17 STAN. L. REV. 158, 162 n.27 (1964) . The applicable theory is that since there is no duty to bargain about an illegal proposal, insisting on such a proposal is itself a refusal to bargain collectively. See NLRB v. Bricklayers Union, 378 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1967). Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 475 (1955) . 128 The greatest threat against which preemption doctrine apparently guards is that a state will prohibit activity that the NLRA indicates must remain unhampered. Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Engr's Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 193 (1965) ; UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 644 (1958) .
1 The test of injunctive relief under a right-to work statute may solely be injury
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Hence a right-to-work law expands the area of enjoinable activity on the basis of criteria in conflict with federal standards. In fact, the basic attitude of a right-to-work law toward unions in general, 1 30 and the use of such economic weapons as the picket line in particular, 1 3 1 assures that the consequences of picketing will vary between a state court and the NLRB. Many right-to-work provisions, for example, condemn picketing with a broad stroke wherever an effect of such conduct, whether direct or indirect, is the application of pressure in almost any form. 132 More importantly, it is doubtful that state courts are equipped to assess the sensitive problems of picketing where it is alleged that a Id. Arkansas similarly makes each day of a violation a separate offense subject to a fine of not more than $5000 for each offense. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-204 (1960) . Enforcement of penal provisions is generally made the responsibility of the local district attorney. E.g., S.D. CODE § 17.9914 (Supp. 1960) . 1I Picketing is subject to express restrictions in several right-to-work acts E. union seeks to force adherence to a union-security arrangement. In terms of work load, the general experience of state courts with labor matters is at best de minimis. It should therefore not be unexpected that state judges, when faced with a complex labor case, frequently tend to search for familiar ground by resort to general principles of law or equity. 1 ' If injunctive relief is sought, this tendency finds expression in the application of such generalized tests as "balancing the equities" or "comparative injury."' 1 4 This kind of technique not only has little relation to the balance struck by Congress between the competing interests of employee, union, and management, but it encourages provincialism in labor regulation. This is especially true in the controversial area of union organizing practices, where the legitimacy of picketing, under both federal and state law, depends primarily upon a determination of the object or purpose of the picketing. Such standards lead inevitably to a subjective examina, tion of motives prompting the decision to engage in coercive practices. The era of the labor injunction demonstrates the risks of leaving courts at large to determine the lawfulness of labor objectives. A numerical count of the picketing cases reveals that such risks still survive. Only occasionally have state courts failed to find picketing not designed to achieve an objective forbidden by rightto-work legislation.
35
The problems involved in permitting the right-to-work states to concurrently regulate peaceful picketing are perhaps most clearly illustrated in cases where a union seeks to protect area labor standards. It has long been recognized that a central aim of collective bargaining is the elimination of competition based on labor costs. Thus a union may legitimately be concerned that a particular employer is undermining area standards of employment by maintaining sub-standard 2 18 The effect of mixing common law tests with right-to-work legislation is demonstrated in Taylor v. Engineers Local 101, 189 Kan. 137, 368 P.2d 8 (1962) , where damages were awarded in a case clearly governed by Garmon. 18, In Electrical Workers Local 1925 v. O'Brien, 202 Tenn. 38, 302 S.W.2d 60 (1957) , the court viewed the issue as one of "threatened irreparable damage" to a contractor in permitting the picketing to continue, as opposed to "very little damage" to the union in halting the picketing. By applying the "balance of convenience rule," the court concluded that the chancellor had not abused his discretion in issuing a restraining order. Id. at 44, 302 S.W.2d at 63.
181
A lawful purpose was found in Carpenters Local 857 v. Todd L. Storms Constr. Co., 84 Ariz. 120, 324 P.2d 1002 (1958 McDaniel v. Tolbert, 228 Ark. 555, 309 S.W.2d 326 (1958); and Self v. Wisener, 226 Ark. 58, 287 S.W.2d 890 (1956). tives, 38 and an ultimate objective of any union is to organize an unorganized shop, it should be apparent that the problems experienced by the Board in administering this section have been both numerous and complicated. 3 9 The difficulty, of course, lies in resolving the question of fact as to a union's purpose or object in picketing. 140 Right-to-work statutes make no express provision for "areastandards" picketing, and rarely are explicit about informational objectives. They simply are not oriented in terms of the federal policy of prohibiting organizational picketing only in specified situations. Consequently, the argument that the sole purpose in picketing is to publicize that an employer maintains sub-standard terms and conditions of employment frequently receives a hostile reception in lower state courts.' 41 Once evidence is presented which, standing alone, 1 37 See note 124 supra for the text of § 8(b) (7). The section is applicable only if picketing has an organizational or recognitional objective. If such an objective is found, the picketing is still not prohibited unless it comes within one of three categories specifically described. Should the picketing satisfy the terms of the third category, sub-section (c), it may still be lawful under the "informational proviso" regardless of the existence of an organizational or recognitional objective. See generally Smitley v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1964) .
2& Picketing may be designed to accomplish a variety of objectives: to compel an employer to recognize and bargain with a union, to solicit the membership of the employer's employees, to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, to compel the employer to assign work to a particular union, to apply pressure in support of union contract demands, or to protest the commission of an unfair labor practice or breach of contract.
189 See generally Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHi. L. Rav. 78 (1962) .
1 0 "Usually, the union's real motives are not articulated; only the consequences of its actions can be accurately ascertained." Aaron, supra note 124, at 1106. The type of fine distinctions emerging under § 8(b) (7) are suggested by the Board's present position that picketing to protect area labor standards is not subject to the section because it does not have recognition or organization as an immediate object, whereas picketing to compel an employer to sign an agreement to pay wages equal to those paid under union contracts is recognitional in purpose. See Centralia Bldg. would support a finding that the picketing objective is condemned by a right-to-work act, the trend in the cases is to end the search for the existence of possible lawful objectives. 142 In practice, the fact-finding process is largely one of evaluating the conduct in question in the narrow context of the terms and policies of the right-to-work act without regard to federal criteria. The treatment of Construction Local 438 v. Curry1 43 in the state courts suggests the dangers inherent in leaving the process to inexpert tribunals. An "open shop" employer undertook performance of a construction contract which required the payment of wages commensurate with those being paid on similar projects in the area. There was evidence that the contractor was paying wages below the area standard, and that he had refused a request by various trade unions to employ union workers on the job. A single picket appeared at the construction site with a sign stating that the contractor was violating his contract with respect to wages. When subcontractors honored the picket line, the contractor petitioned the local court for injunctive relief. The trial judge refused to enjoin the picketing. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed on the ground that the picketing was for a purpose made unlawful by the right-to-work act. 144 The finding of the trial judge that the contractor was in fact paying non-conforming wages carried little weight with the upper court. That court read the record as "demanding" a finding that the real purpose behind the picketing was to force the contractor to employ exclusively union labor. 1 45 As to informational objectives, the Georgia court adopted the startling theory that picketing a construction site as a means of imparting information is necessarily unlawful because it precipitates work stoppages.
146
The contrast between the decisional process represented in this ,12 See, e.g., Hescom, Inc. v. Stalvey, 155 So. 2d 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963 ). Where at least one objective has been found to conflict with a right-to-work law, the existence of other valid objectives has been held immaterial. Construction Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W.2d 958 (1950 opinion and that of the NLRB is indeed striking, in technique as well as selection of controlling legal principles. 1 47 The interest of every union in ultimately organizing a group of employees is a fact of labor life, to be weighed with other evidence bearing upon the question of fact as to union objectives. This same factor, however, when weighed by a state court, may be a sufficient basis for invoking a right-to-work law even though a picketing union has made no demand for immediate recognition, let alone a union-security clause. 148 In fact, whenever picketing follows on the heels of a union demand that an employer grant recognition, observe union standards, or employ union labor, it is likely that a state will construe the picketing to be a disguised attempt to secure an agreement prohibited by state law. The impact of these decisions on national policy would appear to vindicate the Schermerhorn allocation of exclusive jurisdiction of antecedent pressures to the NLRB. Since the risks of improper action are great where an unorganized employer is the target of picketing, the practical significance of Schermerhorn is that it minimizes these risks by limiting state intervention to the ascertainable standard of a consummated agreement. One consequence of applying preemption doctrine to pre-agreement activities is that employers are deprived of quick injunctive relief against harassing union tactics. Because relief from the Board may be slow in forthcoming, or the General Counsel may refuse to issue a complaint' 49 or there is no way in which an employer may elicit from the Board a clear-cut determination of whether employee 147 As a matter of federal law, area-standards picketing is permissible unless the record in its entirety warrants a finding of a present demand for immediate recognition. See, e.g., Raymond F. Schweitzer, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M. 1367 (NLRB 1967 conduct is protected by federal law, 150 it has been urged that preemption affords an employer inadequate protection from coercive conduct designed to force him into a violation of a right-to-work law. 151 These arguments, though meritorious, do not appear sufficiently persuasive to justify state jurisdiction. In the first place, they are generally applicable to all employment relations affected by preemption. The displacement of state power to regulate, in many instances, permits unions to engage in, or prolong, practices never intended to be immune from prohibition or control. 152 The question is whether this development outweighs the harm to federal labor policies likely to result by granting the states greater immediate control of labor activity. If the union-security area is a reliable guide, the objective of a uniform code of industrial relations cannot be realized by permitting concurrent state power to survive. Moreover, it is somewhat ironic that right-to-work laws should be urged as a means of protecting employers from union power when the avowed policy underlying such laws is to insulate the free choice of the individual worker. Although in actual practice employers have invoked right-to-work sanctions more frequently than employees, it would appear unwise to further enlarge the arsenal of employers by means of legislation not primarily concerned with that objective.
150 Although the states may now assume jurisdiction under § 14(c), see note 23 suba, there still must be "a proper determination of whether the case is actually one of those which the Board will decline to hear," Radio Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv., Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) . Since the General Counsel may dispose of a charge without clearly defining the nature of the activity in question under federal law, there is a risk that a "proper determination" will not be made in all cases. See Hanna Mining Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Engr's Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965). As a practical matter, the states are assuming jurisdiction in cases where, on the basis of available evidence, it appears the Board would decline jurisdiction. E.g., Vegas Franchises, Ltd. v. Culinary Workers Local 226, 427 P.2d 959 (Nev. 1967) . In order to facilitate the exercise of state jurisdiction in appropriate cases, the Board has established a procedure for rendering advisory opinions to state courts and agencies on jurisdictional questions. The procedure is discussed in Aaron, supra note 124, at 1095-96. It appears to be almost never used, undoubtedly because state courts are not inclined to consult the Board as to the limits of state jurisdiction. 152 Upon the issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint, § 10 (j) of the NLRA authorizes the Board to petition a federal district court for appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order pending disposition of the matter. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (j) (1964) . This procedure is apparently rarely used. If the complaint issues under § § 8 (b) (4) (A), (B), or (C), 8 (b) (7), or 8 (e), a district court suit for a preliminary injunction is mandatory. See National Labor Relations Act § 10 (1), 29 U.S.C. § 160 () (1964) .
The point should not be overlooked that the new balance struck by federal labor legislation represents an almost total rejection of state ability to regulate the labor-management relation. 1 5 3 In striking and preserving that balance, Congress was surely aware that effectuadon of federal policy could only be achieved at the expense of state regulatory power. The argument that the states should be free to experiment in the right-to-work area has little, if any, appeal. Legislative experimentation simply has not occurred. 154 Perhaps the strongest argument against increasing state competence to deal with picketing by means of right-to-work laws is that the states lack the machinery to handle such matters on any basis other than a temporary one.' 5 5 To simply enjoin picketing does not develop acceptable standards for resolving the underlying issues in a labor dispute. Additional employer protections may be necessary; but the answer does not appear to lie in the direction of state court injunctive relief.
THE RELEVANCE OF AN AGREEMENT
Section 14 (b) expressly places within the reach of state law "agreements" which require union membership "as a condition of employment." Schermerhorn 11 interprets state regulatory power authorized by this section to begin "only with actual negotiation and execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b)."' 56 If a right-to-work law may be applied only in cases which have reached the stage of "agreement," it is essential that some fairly precise understanding of that concept be achieved. Otherwise, by expanding or contracting general tests of contract formation, one court might invoke a rightto-work statute in circumstances which the Board or another court would consider premature. The intrusion into NLRB jurisdiction 47, 49-50 (1962) .
154 Once a right-to-work statute is enacted, the pattern is to leave it intact regardless of changed labor-management practices or developing case law. As to state labor experimentation in general, one commentator has concluded: "The fact remains . . . that for the past two decades at least, social experimentation in labor-relations law has been meager, unimaginative, and ineffective in the states, most of which lack any statutory controls or procedures with respect to labor-management disputes." Aaron, supra note 124, at 1095. Recent legislative trends at the state level are discussed in Smith & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping Labor Relations Law, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 411.
1", Practically none of the right-to-work states have a comprehensive labor code comparable to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA. For a summary of state labor relations legislation see Smith & Clark, supra note 154, at 421-57.
151 375 U.S. at 105 (emphasis in original).
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DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967 [Vol. : 1079 that would result is likely to be most pronounced with respect to practices that occur independent of actual written agreements. Congress has not been explicit about the nature or type of agreements subjected to state power by section 14 (b). Nor has the Supreme Court undertaken analysis of the matter, largely because the cases reaching the Court, aside from the picketing cases, have involved consummated union-security agreements in written form. The question is a critical one because most right-to-work acts prohibit oral as well as written agreements, and many are phrased to reach any "implied agreement, understanding or practice" which discriminately ties employment to union membership. 157 To permit the states to exercise jurisdiction in such cases creates a substantial danger of interference with the federal program."' The risks of non-uniformity in the assessment of factual evidence are as real with respect to implied arrangements as they are in connection with pre-agreement activities. Moreover, if state courts are free to resolve questions of proof of present agreement, the flexibility of judicial standards, plus the differences in the content and application of the various right-to-work laws, produces an atmosphere in which legal structure offers little guidance as to the consequences of concerted activity.
The risks of inconsistent application of the concept of agreement in section 14 (b) are most acute in cases where an employee seeks damages in a state court on the theory that employment was denied or terminated because of an "agreement" in violation of a rightto-work act. Such cases in reality arise out of discriminatory practices arguably subject to federal regulation irrespective of the finding of an agreement. 59 The element of agreement, however, affords right-157 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16-5 (1953). The South Dakota act illustrates the broad area such laws attempt to occupy: "Any agreement relating to employment, whether in writing or oral, which by its stated terms, or by implication, interpretation, or effect thereof, directly or indirectly denies, abridges, interferes with, or in any manner curtails the free exercise of the right-to-work . . . shall be deemed a violation of this section." S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (2) (Supp. 1960) .
15 The inconsistencies likely to result from a sharing of jurisdiction in the area of discriminatory practices is described in Grodin & Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 95, 106-08 (1964) .
111 Except as its provisos regarding union-security permit, § 8 (a) (3) forbids any employer discouragement or encouragement of union membership "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment," and § 8 (b) (2) makes it a union unfair labor practice "to cause or attempt to cause" an employer violation. Discriminatory conduct unilaterally practiced is within the prohibitions of these sections. 
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to-work states a basis for asserting jurisdiction over a wide variety of activities which allegedly interfere with employment relations. 1 00 Seldom is such jurisdiction premised on proof of a written unionsecurity agreement. Indeed, the mere allegation that plaintiff "is informed and believes" that a union and employer have made an arrangement conditioning employment upon membership is generally sufficient. 161 Even where commerce is admittedly affected, and the court concedes an arguable violation of federal law, state jurisdiction has been hinged on vague allegations of a "conspiracy" to enforce compulsory unionism. 1 62 Use of the conspiracy label to accommodate state and federal jurisdiction is particularly disturbing because it unduly enlarges the fact-finding process and leaves to the courts enormous flexibility in defining the content of the legal means and ends of unionism.
63
In view of the fact that discrimination cases require expert assessment of evidence of motivation and effect on employee rights, federal policy can best be effectuated by limiting state power under section 14 (b) to written union-security agreements. 0 4 The language of the section reasonably bears such a construction. Section 14 (b), with obvious reference to section 8 (a) (3), is addressed to the "execution or application" of membership "agreements," while the section 8 (a) (3) proviso is phrased in terms of "making" specific agreements. This suggests that something more formal than oral arrangements or factual practices is contemplated by section 14 (b). Moreover, the history of the integrated collective agreement, and its relation to union status in the industrial unit, would suggest that the limitation 160 For example, in Building Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 A.2d 295 (1955), unions were enjoined from placing the name of a motel on a "we do not patronize list" on the theory that the real objective of the unions was to secure an agreement not permitted by the right-to-work act. 66 The basic difficulty with permitting state action whenever an "executed" agreement, in whatever form, is shown to exist is that it leaves to each state court the factual question of whether execution has occurred.1 67 Aside from the area of potential conflict created by the pliability of the concept of "agreement," there remains unanswered a number of questions about the exercise of state jurisdiction even in cases involving a union-security agreement clearly within section 14 (b). Is federal law irrelevant once it is determined that activity involves a consummated agreement reachable by state power through section 14 (b) ? The question is significant because the execution or application of a union-security agreement may violate federal as well as state law. s 68 For example, the effectuation of a closed shop, either by express contract or discriminatory practices, is banned by both the NLRA 6 9 and right-to-work acts. The states have on numerous occasions applied a right-to-work law on the ground that a closed shop was being practiced or sought. 7 0 A union may, in addition, be a party to area or nation-wide agreements which are subject to federal law yet indirectly involve right-to-work policy. 1 7 ' A given case may also involve both an executed agreement subject to state regulation and independent conduct which is arguably protected or made an unfair labor practice by federal law. This situation could arise where a union-security agreement is supplemented by an employmentreferral arrangement which in fact practices discrimination. Union economic weapons, such as a strike to protest employer practices, might also be employed quite independently of a collective agreement.
If the right-to-work states are permitted to regulate any conduct once a section 14 (b) agreement is found to exist, and state power supercedes federal in all such cases, the result is to remove from the operation of the preemption doctrine activity which violates federal law. It is difficult to find in either the language or legislative history of section 14 (b) support for the view that the states may govern conduct which is federally proscribed as an unfair labor practice. 172 To say that the states may prohibit agreements which are federally permissible is entirely consistent with the objective of preserving the local option to reject traditional forms of compulsory unionism. That objective can obviously be realized without according the states a position of full equality with federal power. Moreover, the limited phrasing of section 14 (b), when considered in relation to the comprehensive detail of federal law, simply does not suggest that Congress intended that parity be achieved between state and federal regulation in union-security matters. Rather, federal law manifests a clear intent to leave unfair labor practices to the expertise of the NLRB rather than the courts.
